

BRITONS

Awake, and Look about you;

O R,

R U I N

T H E

INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE

O F A

LAND-WAR,

Whether SUCCESSFUL, or NOT.

Humbly recommended to the serious
Consideration of ALL True Britons.

By a LOVER of his Country.

*O Navis! referent in Mare Te novi
Fluctus; O quid agis! fortiter occupa
Portum; nonne vides ut
Nudum Remigio Latus,
Et Malus, celeri saucius Africo,
Antennæque gemant?— HOR. Car. B. I. Ode XIV.*

L O N D O N:

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BRITONS *Awake, and Look* *about you, &c.*

AS the War wherein *Great Britain* is at present engaged, on the Continent, in Behalf of the Queen of *Hungary*, engrosses almost all our Attention, and all Conversation; as every Company, and every Coffee-house is full of it, and a Man hears of nothing else, go where he will; as our Countrymen are so very intent thereon, that they stand with *Ears erect*, and big with *Expectation*, each Post-night, greedily listening what News from *Germany*, as if they thought the *Welfare* or *Destruction* of these Kingdoms depended necessarily upon it; as we are likely, very soon, to be yet more deeply involved therein, and may possibly, in a little while, from being Auxiliaries to her *Hungarian* Majesty, become Principals therein ourselves, nay, shall infallibly do so, if the *same Wisdom* which has governed our Counsels of late Years, should still have the Direction of them: As this is the Case, at present, we say, it may not be amiss, coolly and impartially to consider, what may, in *all Probability*, be the Consequence of such a Conduct; or rather, what must inevitably be the Fruits of any *Land-war*, without a kind of Miracle.

In so doing, we shall divest ourselves of all Prejudice and Prepossession; and shall rather avoid setting some Particulars in the strongest Light they will bear, than be guilty of exaggerating them in the least; we shall likewise take care, not to advance any thing, which we are not able to prove incontestably, to the Satisfaction of all those who are not wilfully blind.

In effect, the *true Interest* of *Great Britain* is so very obvious to any Person of common Sense and common Honesty, that a Man must wink hard, before he can pos-

sibly mistake it; and yet there are some certain People whom we don't expect to convince by all the Arguments we can possibly use; nay, whom we would not undertake to convince, that the Sun shined, when in its full Height, on the very brightest Day in June, (though its Beams scorched every one else around them) if they were provided with some weighty Reasons to the contrary, in their Pockets. When we say, we would not undertake to convince them, we mean, not so far as to make them own their Conviction; for otherwise it is impossible, but Men, who have Penetration enough on all other Occasions, should be inwardly persuaded of a Truth which glares in the Eyes of all the rest of their Fellow-subjects. But such is the Force of Self-interest, such is the Depravity of the Generality of Mankind: To this we owe all the Misfortunes under which we have groaned and languished for these twenty Years last past; and to this, it is to be feared, we shall still owe many more.

To prevent this, however, as much as lies in our Power, and warn those whom it may chiefly concern, what Dangers may reasonably be apprehended from the present Situation of our Affairs, is the honest Design of the following Sheets: And if, afterwards, they will run headlong upon their Destruction; though we may ourselves be involved in the general Ruin, together with them, we shall yet have the melancholy Consolation, of having done all that in us lay to alarm them, and put them upon their Guard, notwithstanding our Endeavours have proved ineffectual.

When a Person has the Misfortune to be embarked in a Vessel, which is *curst* with either an *ignorant* or *knaveish* Pilot, who, through *want of Skill*, or, which is as bad, *want of Honesty*, he sees is running her on a Shoal, where she must *inevitably be wrecked*, (hoping to secure himself in the Boat); would it not be such a Person's Duty, though he should be but a Passenger, even for Self-preservation, to warn the Ship's Crew of their Peril, and to endeavour to spirit them up, to save themselves by *wresting the Helm* out of such *weak or wicked Hands*? Nay, would he

he not infallibly do so, if he were truly sensible of his own Danger; unless we could suppose him to be as *stupidly indolent*, as the Man in the Storm, who being told the Vessel was sinking, and desired to help pump, in order to save her, answered very carelessly, *What is it to me, I am but a Passenger?* We take our Case, at present, not to be very different from this; and therefore are not willing to have it to reproach ourselves, that we acted the same *stupid and indolent Part* with the Wretch before mentioned. But, to return from whence we have digressed:

That we may be the better able to judge, what must be the probable Consequences of any *Land-war*, it will be necessary to consider, *First*, What is *the true Interest* of these Kingdoms? *2dly*, In what their *natural and principal Strength* consists? *3dly*, How far their *true Interest* can be *advanced* by a *Land-war*? And *4thly*, How far their *natural Strength* is *consulted* and *exerted* in such a War.

To begin, then, with the *first* of these, It will hardly, we believe, be disputed, that as *Great Britain* is a trading Nation, the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms is, to *advance* and *extend* our *Commerce* with all *possible Industry* and *Diligence*; and to *cultivate* and *improve* those *natural Advantages* with which *Providence* (kinder to us than we deserve) has *peculiarly blessed us*, as far as they are capable of *Improvement*. This being the Case, as undoubtedly it is, nothing can be more evident, than that we ought to *cultivate the Arts of Peace*, by which alone Trade flourishes; and that we ought never to *engage in any War*, unless it be in Defence of our *just Rights* and *Liberties*, or to prevent a *manifest and otherwise inevitable Danger*; and, even in that Case, it is demonstrable, we never ought to involve ourselves in a *Land-war*.

That peaceable Times only are proper for the *Advancement* and *Extension* of our *Commerce*, is what surely will not be denied by any Man in his Senses. It is a self-evident Axiom in Politicks. But, when we say so, we would not willingly be misunderstood. In effect, when we use the

the Term *Peace*, we do not mean such a one as we groan-
ed under for many Years before the Declaration of War
with the *Spaniards*; when they insulted and barraged us,
as they pleased, with *Impunity*, whilst our Hands were
tied up, from either offending them, or defending ourselves.
Neither do we mean such a Peace as leaves any, even
the most distant Pretence, for keeping up, at home, a nu-
merous Body of Land-forces: No; such a Peace is rather
more destructive than a War; it has all its Disadvantages
without any of its Advantages. On the contrary, the
Peace we mean, is such a one, as not only eases the Peo-
ple of the most burthensome Taxes, such as those upon Coals,
Candles, Soap, Leather, and, in short, all the immediate
Necessaries of Life; but admits of the Reduction of our
Army at Home, to the same Number as it consisted of
in the Time of *Charles II.* or, if that be thought too se-
vere, as it was in the Reign of *Queen Anne*, even whilst
we were engaged, as Principals, in one of the most vi-
gorous and bloody Wars that ever was known in *Europe*.

We take it then for granted, that we can never advance
and extend our Commerce, but whilst the Nation enjoys a
solid and lasting Peace; and this for divers unanswerable
Reasons. That we can never do it in a Time of War,
is indisputable: For so far are we from being able so to
do, that we always find it evidently decline; nor is this
to be wondered at, when we consider the great Charge of
Convoys, the tedious Delays frequently attending them,
and the heavy Taxes almost inseparable from a State of Ho-
stility. In a Word, it has ever been allowed, that as
Plenty is the constant Attendant of Peace, so Poverty is the
never-failing Companion of War; which proceeds, entire-
ly, from the certain Stagnation of Trade under the latter,
and its prosperous and flourishing Condition under the for-
mer.

Nor is it only when the Nation is at open War, that
our Trade can neither be advanced nor extended; it will
labour under almost as many Disadvantages, nay, in
some respects, under more, whilst we enjoy but a preca-
rious or nominal Peace; because, at such Times, Pre-
tences

tences will never be wanting for keeping up a *numerous Body of Land-forces*, besides *considerable naval Armaments*; And as all this cannot be done, without putting the Publick to an excessive Expence, to defray which, *heavy Duties* must be laid either upon the *Necessaries of Life*, or on *divers Sorts of Commodities*, and perhaps upon *both*; it is evident, the Manufacturers will not be able to afford their respective Goods so cheap, as when they don't groan under such Burthens; by this Means our Neighbours will be enabled to *undersel* us at *foreign Markets*, and consequently our Trade must inevitably *languish* and *decline*.

Of this melancholy Truth, we have lately had but too undeniable Proofs, for very near twenty Years; during which we were told, that we enjoyed a Peace, but had never been without a *numerous standing Army*, and *formidable Squadrons at Sea*; though, for that Time, we heard of nothing but *perpetual Depredations*, and outrageous *Insults*, with *ridiculous* and *useless*, nay, what is more, *dishonourable, destructive, and fatal Expeditions*; not to mention *long and unnecessary Embargoes*, with the frequent issuing of *Pres-warrants* (often *most unwarrantably* put in Execution) for no other *visible Reason*, but to *distress* the Merchants.

As this was necessarily productive of *heavy Duties*, and *most burthensome Taxes*, could it be expected, that Trade should any ways *flourish*, during *such a Peace*? On the contrary, was it at all surprizing, that it should *visibly decline*; or that several Branches thereof should be almost entirely lost, and that our *wiser* Neighbours should have *wormed us out of them*? No; *this was* what every Man of *common Sense* foresaw; but all this could not prevail on our *honest Premier* to take *more salutary Measures*. In Effect, it is a general Rule, which will eternally hold good at all Times and in all Nations, That as a *wise and upright Minister* will always conclude a *lasting Peace*, or *push on a War vigorously*, unless reduced, by the Success of the Enemy, to accept of disadvantageous Conditions; so a *weak, wicked, and corrupt one*, will be continually *patching up precarious Treaties*; or, if forced into a War, will

will carry it on in a *languid, cowardly and inglorious Manner*. Again, a *wise Minister* will always endeavour to *ease and unite* the People, as much as possible; whilst a *blundering Profligate*, when at the Helm, will be continually *studying and contriving* to *load and barraß* them with *intolerable Imposts*; which he will likewise *attempt to have levied* in the *most vexatious and oppressive Manner*; as this unhappy Nation has more than once experienced to her Cost.

From what has been premised, we think it demonstrable, that neither a *Time of War*, nor an *unsettled Peace*, can be proper for the *Advancement or Extension* of our *Commerce*; and, consequently, that the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms must *necessarily suffer* during either. It is true, it may so fall out, that Things may be brought to such an *unlucky Crisis*, as to render a *War unavoidable*, and even *advisable and eligible*, as happened lately with regard to *Spain*: But then, it must be observed, that this is only to *prevent a greater Evil*, and is almost always the *Consequence* of some *previous Mismanagement and Male-administration*; as was likewise the Case with respect to that War; and will again be, if we should be soon engaged in an open Rupture with *France*.

In effect, it is evident, had we not attacked the *Spaniards* in the *Mediterranean* in 1718, or had we afterwards accepted of the *Mediation* between *France* and *Spain*, upon the *Difference* that happened between them, on sending back the *Infanta*; we should have been so far from meeting with the same ill Usage as we have since experienced from the Court of *Madrid*, that we might almost have made our own Terms with them, and have had all imaginable Indulgence in our Trade to the *West-Indies*.

Again, it is as evident, had we kept a watchful Eye upon all the Steps of *France*; had we shewn ourselves disposed to act with Vigour, if ever she gave us the least Cause of Complaint; had we declared, upon her first Attempt to repair the Fortifications or Port of *Dunkirk*, that we should look upon it as a Breach of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and take our Measures accordingly; had we guarded well
against

against her *stealing our Wool, running in her own Brandies, Teas and Cambricks* upon us, or *inlistering* our Men to recruit her *Irish* Regiments, we should have had no Reason now to dread her exorbitant Power; nor would she have *dared* to behave as she has of late Years, had not we acted with so much Supineness and Indolence.

Notwithstanding, therefore, it was requisite, about four Years ago, to declare War with *Spain*, and it may be as requisite, very soon, to come to Hostilities with *France*; this will not prove, that it is the true Interest of these Kingdoms to be at Variance with either of them; but only that we had brought ourselves, by our *blessed Management*, into such a *hopeful Condition*, that it was necessary to have Recourse to Arms, to extricate us out of it, and *obtain Redress*; as a Man, who had a *gangrened Limb*, would consent to have it *scarified*, or even *cut off*, in order to save his Life, and recover his Health. When any one, by his Debaucheries, or irregular Living, has brought a Surfeit or Fever upon himself, it will certainly be requisite for him, to have Recourse to proper Remedies, *however unpalatable*; and it may then, in one Sense, be said to be his *true Interest* so to do: But will not every one allow, it would have been much more his *true Interest* to have preserved his Health, whilst he enjoyed it, by *Temperance and Sobriety*? In the like manner, when a Nation has been brought into desperate Circumstances, by *weak or corrupt Management*, it may be *necessary and advisable* to have Recourse to Arms to retrieve them; and consequently this may be then said to be her *true Interest*: But does not every one see, it would have been much more her *true Interest*, to have prevented her being brought into such a Case, by *prudent and salutary Measures*? War then can never, with any *common Sense*, be said to be the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms, but when it is to *avoid a greater Evil*, as to *prevent the Invasion of our just Rights*, or for the *Protection of our Commerce*. Whether both these might not better be effected by a *vigorous and wise Conduct*, is what we shall not at present inquire into. Suffice it now for

us, that we have shewn the *Advancement* and *Extension* of our *Trade*, to be the *true Interest* of the *British Nation*; suffice it, that we have likewise shewn, this cannot be expected, either while we are in a State of War, or whilst we enjoy but a precarious or nominal Peace; and this for divers obvious Reasons. It will necessarily follow from hence, that we ought never to come to Hostilities, but when our Forbearance will be attended with yet worse Consequences than a Rupture; and it will still more necessarily follow from hence, that we ought never to engage in *such a War*, as, *whether successful or not*, can never *prove advantageous to ourselves*, *whatever it may to others*. But of this more hereafter.

Come we now to consider, in what the *natural* and *principal Strength* of these Realms consists; for as to the *cultivating* and *improving* those *natural Advantages* with which Providence has *peculiarly blessed us*, they almost necessarily follow from the *Advancement* and *Extension* of our *Trade*, unless *we wilfully shut our Eyes*. In effect, all the four Particulars which we have proposed to weigh, are, in a great measure, connected and interwoven with each other, though, for the better Illustration of each of them, we have thought proper to take a View of them under as many several Heads.

The *natural* and *principal Strength*, then, of these Realms (and, indeed, of every State) consists, 1st, in a *mutual Union* of the *Subjects among themselves*, and the *Establishment* of a *reciprocal Love* and *Confidence* between the *Prince* and *his People*: 2^{dly}, In our being always *able* to fit out such a *formidable Fleet*, whenever it is requisite, and that at as *short a Warning* as possible, as may *strike a Terror* into our *Enemies*: And 3^{dly}, In the *Number* of *brave Inhabitants*, wherewith these Islands are blessed. That our principal Strength consists in our being at Unity amongst ourselves, is what, we believe, will scarce be denied by any one, and consequently we should think it quite needless to advance any Arguments in support thereof; especially after we have had the Authority of
our

our Saviour to confirm the Truth of it, who expressly tells us, *A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand.*

We say, we should think it quite needless to multiply Words in support of this Axiom, but that a *bellicose Doctrine* has been industriously propagated of late Years, that it is *necessary* to *keep up* the *odious Distinctions* of *Whig and Tory, High and Low Church*, for the *Security* of the *Protestant Interest*, and the *Succession* of the *Crown* in the *present Family*. That this Doctrine *smells strong* of the *infernal Pit*, every one *must see*; for, that *all Division* proceeds from the *Devil*, no one can deny. What then do *these Monsters, these Prostitutes* mean? They *would not*, they *dare not* *sure insinuate*, that there is no way of *supporting* the *present Succession*, but by *going to the D—l*; and yet that is the *direct Consequence* of this *villanous Doctrine*. If so, we must think we have *bought it very dear*: Tho' we will not venture to say, even if that is the Case, that we might almost as well have trusted Providence with our Safety; because we know not what *Construction* a *profligate Sp—c—l J—y*, tutored by a *thorough-paced A—y G—l*, and directed by an *obsequious B—nch*, might be induced to put upon it. In effect, this would be carrying our Attachment to the Government a very great Length indeed; for, though we have heard, that we ought to venture our Lives for the Preservation of our King and Country, which certainly is but reasonable, we never heard 'till lately, what this Doctrine evidently inculcates, that we ought to *bazard our Souls also for them*.

How unlikely soever such *absurd Tenets* were, to *prevail* on any Man of *common Sense*, we have seen them *too successfully inculcated* for many Years, particularly about the Time of Elections, (by those two *abandoned Prostitutes*, *Messieurs Walsingham and Osborn*), to prevent a *Coalition of Parties*, and hinder the Dissenters from *uniting* with the rest of their *independent Countrymen*, against the *great Leviathan* who so long *oppressed us*, and whose *Safety* depended entirely upon our being a *divided People*. But, though the Security of a *wicked*

Minister may depend upon our Divisions, that is, in other Words, our Unhappiness; it is very evident the *Welfare, Grandeur and Prosperity* of the *present Royal Family* is *interwoven* with ours; our Interests are the same, and can be promoted by nothing so much as an *Union* among ourselves, and a *reciprocal Love and Confidence* between *our Sovereign* and *his People*. Whoever therefore, by *wicked or weak Counsels*, goes about to *lessen this*, or to set the Nation at Variance among themselves, must have some *sinister Ends*, that will not *bear the Light*, and is *equally a Traitor* to his Prince and his Country. Thus much we thought it necessary to say, in order to send that *hellish Doctrine* back to the Pit from whence it came, and prevent its ever being broached again amongst us.

Having thus demonstrated, that our Strength consists chiefly in our being united, we shall next proceed to shew, that it consists likewise in our being *able* to fit out on any Emergency, and at a *short Warning*, such a *formidable Fleet*, as may *strike a Terror* into the *boldest of our Enemies*. This, we think, will never be denied by any one who considers, 1st, that we are a *trading Nation*, and must *depend* upon *our Navy* for the *Protection of our Commerce*; and 2^{dly}, that we are *surrounded by the Sea*, and consequently can neither be *invaded ourselves*, nor *attack others*, but by a *naval Armament*. In effect, whilst we are *Lords of the Ocean*, and *united at home*, we may *safely defy* all *Europe*, though they should be *combined against us*; and there is *more Truth*, than most People are aware on, in those admirable Verses of Mr. Waller:

LORDS of the World's great Waste, the OCEAN, we
Whole Forests send, to reign upon the Sea;
And ev'ry Coast may trouble or relieve:
But none can VISIT US without our Leave.
ANGELS and we have this PREROGATIVE,
That none can at our happy Seat arrive;
Whilst we descend, at Pleasure, to invade
The Bad with Vengeance, and the Good to aid.

HAP-

HAPPY, HAPPY Britons, did we know wherein our chief Strength and Happiness consists, and did we exert and promote it accordingly! What might not a King of Great Britain, supported by an united and affectionate People, and truly consulting and promoting their mutual Interest, be able to accomplish? We had almost said, he might be able to give Laws to all Europe. In effect, as Trade is the Source of Riches, and Riches the Source of Power, and we have such infinite Advantages over the rest of Mankind, not only by our happy Situation, but by the Product of our Country, and, which is not the least, our excellent Constitution, it is evident to a Demonstration, we might almost engross the Wealth of the Universe. The Spaniards would be but our Factors, and would possess their Mines, not so much for themselves as us. Nor would even the Dutch be any thing better, since they could not carry on their East-India Trade, without our Permission; and the Product of their Spice Islands might be more ours than their own. In a Word we might enjoy all the Advantages of that Commerce, without the heavy Clog of those exquisite Monopolists (the perpetual Tails of a corrupt Ministry) the East-India Company.

Come we now to consider the third Article wherein our Strength consists, namely, in the Number and Bravery of our People. And this we think is a Point almost self-evident, and not to be contested; it being generally agreed, that not only the Strength, but the Riches of a State consists in the Number of its Inhabitants. Accordingly the Dutch, as politick a Nation as any in Europe, never refuse to naturalize as many as desire it, nor to receive as many as will settle there. It is true, indeed, they will take care not to have any useless Hands amongst them, to lie as a dead Weight upon the Industrious; and they are to be commended for it: If any therefore come thither, and neither bring with them a Sufficiency for their Maintenance, nor are able to subsist themselves by any Business, they are sure to provide them both Work and Sustenance, by putting them

them into their *Rasp-buys*, which answers to our *Bridewells*; in which Piece of sound Policy, it would be well if we followed their Example. Taking it then for granted, that the Strength of any State consists, in a great measure, in the Number and Bravery of its Inhabitants, we shall only observe, that *Great Britain* is the most populous and warlike Nation that is, or perhaps ever was, for its Extent; that in *England* alone, exclusive of *Scotland* or *Ireland*, we are reckoned at the lowest Computation, to amount to seven Millions of Souls; and that consequently the Number of able-bodied Men, computing them at the Proportion of one Fourth, is one Million seven hundred and fifty thousand; out of which might be spared, in case of Necessity, a Force more than sufficient, not only to repel all Invasions at home, but to man such a Navy, as with proper Orders would spread a Terror and exact Submission, where-ever it appeared; such a Navy as would be able to verify that fine Compliment, of the above mentioned Mr. *Waller*, to *Oliver Cromwel*:

*Where-e'er thy Navy spreads her Canvas Wings,
Homage from all, and Wealth to thee she brings.*

Another Circumstance wherein our Strength consists, and which we forgot to insist on before, is our being surrounded by the Sea, and, consequently, not liable to any Invasions by Land, nor obliged to keep up any standing Army, or fortify any of our Inland Towns. This is such a considerable Advantage as we can never too thankfully acknowledge, especially as we are a Protestant Nation, and there is a Pretender to the Crown of these Realms, a bigotted Papist, who would otherwise have been long ago supported with a Force sufficient to over-run these Kingdoms; whereas we are now more than a Match for the utmost Power, all our Enemies, in Combination together, can possibly send against us.

We have now considered the several Particulars upon which the Strength of these Kingdoms principally depends; let us next examine how far our true Interest can

can be *advanced* by a *Land-war*. We have already shewn wherein *our true Interest* consists, namely, in the *Advancement* and *Extension* of our *Commerce*, and in *cultivating* and *improving* the *natural Advantages* wherewith Providence has *peculiarly blessed* us. We have already shewn, and we hope to a *Demonstration*, that any War is diametrically contrary to the *Advancement* or *Extension* of our *Trade*, as it must necessarily occasion *heavy Taxes* to defray the *Expences* of it; and these Taxes, whether laid upon the *Necessaries of Life* or upon our *Manufatures*, must inevitably raise the Price of them, and consequently *enable* our *Neighbours* who are our *Rivals* in *Trade* to *undersel* us at *foreign Markets*.

But, if any *War* is contrary to the *Advancement* of our *Commerce*, it is certain a *Land-war* is much more so, as it is vastly more *expensive* and *destructive*, by *draining* us more of our *most useful Men* and our *Money*, than a War by *Sea* can do. It cannot therefore be pretended, with any *Shew of Reason*, that the *Prosperity* of our *Trade* is consulted by such a War. As little can it be pretended, that our *natural Advantages* will be either *cultivated* or *improved* thereby; it would be the Height of *Affurance* to affirm it. In effect, will any one pretend to say, that our *Woollen Manufacture* at home will *flourish* the more for a *Land-war*; that there will *more Hands* be *employed* therein; that it will meet with *more Encouragement*; or that a *more effectual Stop* will be put to that *pernicious* and *destructive Practice* of *Wooling*, or *exporting* our *Wool*, either to our *open Enemies*, or, which is as bad, our *false Friends*? We believe no one will offer to assert any thing so absurd. Again, not to descend to any more *Particulars*, will any one aver, that our *Fishery*, especially the *Herring-fishery*, that *beneficial Branch* of our *Commerce*, which *courts* us, in a manner, at our *own Doors*, will be either *cultivated* or *improved* during a *consuming Land-war*? No one sure will dare to advance any thing so *improbable*; the *Absurdity* of it would stare every one in the Face. We think therefore we need not multiply Words, to prove that *our true Interest* can
never

never be *consulted* or *promoted* by any such Measure. No, no; it is very evident, whoever's *Advantage* may be *taken care of* by such a Conduct, that of *Great Britain* must *suffer egregiously*, and be *altogether neglected*.

Proceed we now to consider how far *our natural Strength* is *exerted* or *consulted* by a *Land-war*. We have already shewn, that the *natural Strength* of these Realms consists in the *mutual Union* of our *Fellow-subjects* amongst themselves, and the *Establishment* of a *reciprocal Love* and *Confidence* between *our Sovereign* and *us*: Now let us see how these *two desirable Ends* are *promoted*, by *engaging us* in a *War* upon the *Continent*.

That a *Land-war* lies *heavier* upon the Subject than any other, is *manifest* for several Reasons; but, to instance only one, it *drains* us more, not only of our *most useful Hands*, we mean, our *most able bodied Men*; but, as if that were not enough, it exhausts *our Money* also, which is sent *abroad* to *maintain* our Troops, and *never returns* to us again: Whereas, in a *War by Sea*, we can never *lose so many Men*, and far the *greatest Part* of our *Money* is expended *at home* amongst ourselves. Now, how *our natural Strength* can be said either to be *consulted* or *exerted* by a *War*, which must *impoverish* us *sooner*, and *more* than any other, we must confess ourselves at a loss to discover. That it might possibly occasion a *mutual Union* amongst our Countrymen, we will not pretend to deny; but then it would be *such an Union*, as, how *desirable soever* *UNITY* may be, would be neither to be *wished for* nor *coveted*; in short, it would be only an *Union of Complaints*; an *Union* in *detesting*, *execrating* and *abominating* all those *weak* or *wicked Counsellors*, who *projected* or *agreed* to such a *destructive Measure*.

Again, how this can conduce to the *establishing* a *reciprocal Love* and *Confidence* between the *Prince* and *People*, we cannot possibly see; but it might probably produce a *quite different Effect*: It might create an *almost unsurmountable Mistrust* and *Diffidence* between them, which could not but be attended with *very melancholy Consequences*. For, on the one hand, when the Nation saw
their

their Sovereign pursuing such Measures, *incompatible with their Welfare*, would it not be natural for them to imagine he had been persuaded his Interest was very different from theirs? On the other hand, when the Sovereign found his Subjects *utterly averse to*, and *murmuring at* those *Proceedings* which he had been made, though *falsely*, to believe, were most for his Advantage; would he not be tempted to suppose they were at least *somewhat disrespectful*, if he did not go yet farther, and suspect them of *Disaffection*? It is very evident, nothing could be more natural on both Sides. And what might be the *Consequence* of such a *mutual Jealousy*, we tremble to think; we shall therefore only say, Heaven forbid such a Misfortune should ever befall us! However, should we ever be so unhappy, as no one can tell what may happen hereafter; it is most certain, whoever were the *Advisers* of such a *pernicious Conduct*, or whoever agreed thereto, whether it were through *Weakness* or *Wickedness*, whatever might be their Motives, nothing can be more clear than that they would be *equally Traytors* to their King and Country; it being an *undeniable Truth*, that the *surest Support* of a Throne is *the Love* of the Subjects, which can never be *preserved*, but by *pursuing such Measures* as are *compatible with*, and *conducive to* their *Welfare* and *Prosperity*.

Another Point, wherein *our natural* and *principal Strength* consists, is in our being always able, to fit out *such a formidable Fleet*, at a *short Warning*, as may *strike a Terror* into the *boldest of our Enemies*, and *maintain our Empire on the Seas*. This is an Article that never was disputed by any one; and this being the Case, how can it be pretended, that we either *consult* or *exert* this *natural Strength* by a *Land-war*? Or, how can it be said, that *such a War* conduces towards *asserting our Dominion* on the *Seas*? Is it not evident, that it cannot do either of these? And, consequently, is it not evident, that, by carrying on a War upon the Continent, we should give our Enemies a *great Advantage* over us, and *neglect* that very Circumstance wherein alone *our Superiority* consists? In effect, does not every one know, that we are *not able*

to cope with them *by Land*, unless we are *vigorously supported* by a *very powerful Alliance*, which is by *no means* to be *depended on*; whereas we are *singly more than a Match* for them upon the watry Element? It must therefore be little less than *Infatuation*, should we engage in a War, wherein we should *labour* under *all manner of Disadvantages*, whilst, by attacking our Enemies by Sea, we should be able to do them *infinitely more Prejudice*, and reduce them to *Reason much sooner*, with incomparably *less Hazard* and *Expence* to ourselves.

A third Point wherein our Strength consists, is in the *Number* and *Bravery* of our Countrymen. But this, though an exceeding great Advantage, if *rightly managed*, as to *defend* ourselves *when invaded*, to *man* our *Navy*, or to carry on our Manufactures, &c. can be but of *little Service* to us if we *pursue wrong Measures*. For Instance, in case of an *Invasion*, it would be impossible for our Enemies, if they should escape our Fleet, to pour in so many Men upon us, but what we should be able by our Numbers to cut them all in Pieces in a few Days, were we but *united*, and our Militia ever so little disciplined. Again, were it necessary to carry on a Sea-war, we have Hands *more than enough* to *man* our *Navy*, and *defeat any Force* that could be brought against us; not only so, but whatever Losses we might suffer in such a War, we should be able for many Years to find sufficient Numbers to recruit them, and all this without *so far draining* our Country, as to leave it destitute of the Hands requisite for *tilling the Ground*, *carrying on our Manufactures*, and such like necessary Uses.

But the Case would be *widely different*, should we resolve to *attack a Power by Land*, whose Dominions, being of much *larger Extent* than these Realms, should enable him, not only to send his hundreds of Thousands into the Field, but constantly to *recruit* whatever Losses he might suffer by *Defeats* or *Desertion*; as *populous* as these Kingdoms are, we should soon find ourselves no Match for such an Enemy: For though we might at first be able to oppose him with as numerous an Army, the many thousands it would require each Campaign, to keep it up, would be
such

such a *continual Drain* upon our Country as must leave it in a manner a *Desert* in a few Years, and *exhaust* all the *Flower* of the Nation; so that we must at last *sink* under the Burden, whilst our Enemy though he might *suffer equal*, or even *greater Losses* than ourselves, might be able, through the greater Extent of his Dominions, not only to retrieve, but to bear up under them, and, in the End, *overwhelm us* by mere Dint of Numbers.

A *melancholy* and *fatal Example* of this Truth, and at the same time *an useful Lesson* to all succeeding Princes, we have seen, within our Memory, in the Person of the *unfortunate* and *ill-advised* Monarch *Charles XII.* King of *Sweden*: Who, though he met with *uninterrupted Success*, for many Years together, against all his Enemies, had so *effectually exhausted* his Country by his continual Wars, that, upon his receiving *one single Defeat* at *Pultowa*, he was *irrecoverably ruined*; whilst his Enemy, the *Czar*, though he had been *constantly worsted* in every Engagement, and on all Occasions, was enabled, by the superior Extent of his Territories, not only to *bear up* under his Losses, but at last to *vanquish his Conqueror*. Should any one alledge, that this Hero's Ruin was not owing to his attacking a Prince so much his Superior, by his vast Dominions and the Numbers of his Men, but to his retiring into *Turky*; we beg he would consider, that, by all Accounts, his Kingdom was *so much drained* of its most useful Hands, that the *very Women* were forced to *till the Ground*, *drive their Carriages*, *ply upon their Rivers*, and in short perform all those *laborious Offices*, for which the *most robust Men* alone were proper; that, consequently, had he not *taken Refuge* in *Turky*, had he even *continued successful* for some time longer, his *very Victories* must have undone him in the End, by *depopulating* his Country; which has not yet recovered the Damage it suffered by so *imprudent a Conduct*.

Another material Point, wherein our *principal Strength* consists, and to which we ought to have an Eye in all our Undertakings, is, that we are Islanders, surrounded by the Sea; *an Advantage*, without which, all others *would avail us very little*. But this Advantage, how great so-

ever, may be rendered of no Effect by ill Conduct: For Instance, the *same happy Situation*, which renders it *impossible* for any, or all our Enemies, to *invade us* with any Probability of Success, provided we are tolerably united, renders it *equally impracticable* for us to make any Attacks upon them by Land, without labouring under all Manner of Disadvantages. The only War, from which we can promise ourselves any Success, or derive any good, is a War by Sea: By such a War we can *annoy* our Enemies more than by any other; and, by such a War, we can *better repel* any Attacks made upon us by them. It follows, consequently, that our *natural Strength* can never be either *exerted*, or *consulted*, by engaging in any *War* upon the Continent.

Accordingly, we defy all Mankind, to point out *any one single Advantage* that can *possibly result to us* from such an *absurd and preposterous Conduct*, to call it by *no harder Name*; whereas the *Prejudice* we may receive from thence is *infinite and evident*. It is agreed on all hands, we do not want to make any Conquests by Land; it is not our Interest so to do; and, if we should be *so weak* as to desire it, our Allies themselves (if we have any worth calling so) would not consent thereto, but would oppose it. What Business then can we have to involve ourselves in a War, which *probably* may be *excessively detrimental*, if not absolutely *ruinous*, and cannot *possibly* be of *any service* to us?

To descend from generals to particulars, the only Motives that have been openly avowed, for our *engaging so deeply* in the present War in *Germany*, are, to *restore Peace* to the *Empire*, and *support* the *Queen of Hungary*. Very specious Pretences, we must confess! and which carry a pretty plausible Appearance to those who look no farther than the Outside of Things; but which will by no means be *satisfactory* to any *honest and thinking Briton*, if we have still any such left amongst us; which, by what we have seen happen, within these two Years, we are almost tempted to question.

If it should be pretended, that the latter of these, namely, the Support of the *Queen of Hungary*, was *really* one of the Motives for our *entering so deeply* into the present War,

War, several Difficulties will arise, which we are afraid it would puzzle some of our wisest Heads to solve. In the first place, Why was it so long delayed? Why did we suffer her Hungarian Majesty to be brought to the very Brink of Ruin before we offered to assist her? Why did we sit still and see her Dominions so cruellyarrassed, and her whole Strength and Wealth in a Manner exhausted before a single Man was ordered to move to her Relief? Is it not evidently owing only to a Miracle, and to the visible Interposition of the divine Providence in her Behalf, that her whole Inheritance was not entirely swallowed up, whilst we continued quiet Spectators of the Barbarity and Injustice of her merciless and cowardly Enemies?

If therefore it was expedient, or necessary for us, to assist her at all, does not every one see it would have been more adviseable to have done it sooner? Either it was, or it was not requisite to espouse her Interest, and save her from sinking. If it was not, why have we armed now so many thousands in her Quarrel? And, if it was, does not every one see we might have done it at less Expence, and with infinitely less Hazard, whilst she was herself able to make a vigorous Struggle in her own Defence, than at present, when she has suffered so much from the Ravages of her Oppressors, and lost such Numbers of her choicest Men? What shall we say to such monstrous Politicks? Or rather, what will all the World think of such absurd Conduct? Did we suffer that glorious Princess to be reduced so low, and her Enemies to triumph so long over her, only to show Mankind we can still pull down the latter, and restore the former to her pristine Splendor, by the superior Force and Bravery of the invincible Armies of Great Britain and Hanover? Such a Piece of Knight-errantry might sound very well in a Romance, but will make a very indifferent Appearance in History.

Again, when it was once resolved to assist her Hungarian Majesty, why were the sixteen thousand Hanoverians, which we had so prudently taken into our Pay about the Beginning of last Winter, ordered down to Flanders, where it was known they could be of no Service? and why were they not sent after Maillebois, to harass him in his March, and

and prevent the Retreat of the French Forces; which being cooped up in Prague, must have been either cut in Pieces, famished, or made Prisoners at Discretion? But that Punning may seem too ludicrous, upon so melancholy a Subject, we would fain ask, where was the Discretion of such unaccountable Measures?

Shall it eternally be truly said by Foreigners, to the Reproach of our Country, that the English have indeed Abundance of Wit, but then it is only After-wit? Shall we always resemble the late Lord Wharton's PUPPIES, by never opening our Eyes, 'till we are downright sinking? Are not all Evils, if foreseen in time, to be prevented at an easier and cheaper Rate, than they can be remedied afterwards? Did we never before discover, that the Power of France was growing formidable to Europe? Have not the Gentlemen in the Opposition alarmed us frequently, for many Years, with Representations of its continual Increase? Are not divers of their Speeches yet extant? Nay, have not all the publick Writers, except those Prostitutes in the Pay of the M——y, taken the Alarm, and echoed the impending Danger throughout the Kingdom? And what has been the Consequence thereof? Were not both the one and the other represented at one Time as seditious and disaffected Persons, who were perpetually disturbing the Tranquillity of the Nation, by infusing into them vain Fears of imaginary and chimerical Perils, that existed no where but in their own Brain; whilst our wise, honest, and sagacious M——r persisted in still contributing, by every Step he took, towards the Aggrandisement of that our natural Enemy, regardless of all that could be said against it? And at another Time, when the Danger was become too visible to be denied, was not the Note changed? and was not this very Danger urged against us, and but too successfully, for many Years, to prevent our taking Revenge of a cruel, cowardly, and despicable Nation, who had not only insulted and plundered us, but committed the most insolent and provoking Outrages, equally to the Dishonour of our Sovereign and his Subjects?

Was not, we say, this the very Case? Was not the Danger of incensing France, urged with too much Success,

to prevent our declaring War against Spain, in our own Cause? Nay, was it not even said, that we must not dare to intercept or seize the Galleons, though we should come to a Rupture with Spain, because the French had the greatest Share of Property therein, and would not SUFFER it?

Did we not wink at the Marquis D'Antin's Expedition to the Baltick, though it was openly declared that one Part of his Business was to sound our Coasts; and though it put us to the Charge of fitting out a peaceable Squadron, to prevent any sinister Designs that might be concealed under that Pretence? Did we not even wink at his second Expedition to the West-Indies, and suffer him to proceed so far thereon before we sent any Ships after him, that, had not Providence interposed in our favour, not only Admiral Vernon and his Squadron must have been swallowed up by the united Navy of France and Spain, but probably Sir Chaloner Ogle himself, with his Fleet, must likewise have fallen a Sacrifice in the second place? Is any one so weak as to imagine that the Marquis D'Antin would not have assisted the Spaniards, could he but have joined them before the Arrival of Sir Chaloner? And was it not owing entirely to contrary Winds that he did not? Is it not evident, by the Conduct of the Marquis in returning immediately to Europe, when he found his Design frustrated by the Junction of our Admirals, that this was the sole End of his Voyage? Or do we believe the French were fond of copying after our wise Example, in fitting out peaceable Squadrons, and putting the Publick to unnecessary Expence, to persuade their Enemies into Compliance with their Desires? Was not the whole Nation so universally convinced, that the French Fleet were sent to join the Spaniards, and fall with their united Force upon Admiral Vernon, that we all gave him over for lost? Was it not even suggested, that it was the Desire of some Persons at home, who bore that gallant Officer no good Will, and were utterly averse to our declaring War, that he might be defeated? In effect, might it not be truly said of him on that Occasion, as was on another of Queen Elizabeth, that the

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Elements fought for him. And might not this Compliment be justly applied to him?

O! *nimium dilecte Deo, cui militat Æther,
Et conjurati veniunt ad Classica venti.* Claudian.

Was not this, we say again, the real Case? And did we not *wink* at all these *gross Affronts*, rather than draw upon us the Power of *France* in our own Cause? Nay; did we not even *wink* at her *building divers Batteries* near *Dunkirk*, on pretence of *guarding her Coasts* from *Insults*, to avoid *breaking* with her on any Account, though our own Interest was in question? And are we now, *wantonly*, bringing *her Arms* upon us, without any *fresh Provocation*, and that in *another's Quarrel*, and (what is yet worse) in a *consuming Land-war*? Amazing Change! or rather *monstrous Inconsistence* in our Councils! But, what shall we say? We hope we are not as yet fallen under that heavy Curse, *Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*

In effect, either our *past Conduct* for at least these dozen Years was *weak and destructive*, or our *present Measures* must be so; and some, perhaps, may be *so malicious* to insinuate, neither of them *are much better*. But, however that may be, this is evident. Granting the former to be the Case, if we are now to act the *Part of Penelope*, by *pulling down* what we have been so long *building up*, and running counter to all our Measures for that Time, one Step more was *absolutely necessary*, even for our own *Vindication*; namely, the making a *publick Recantation*, by *disclaiming* and *disavowing* our past Conduct, by *owning* we had been *imposed on*, and *betrayed*, and (which likewise *necessarily* follows) by an *Impeachment* and *vigorous Prosecution* of *those*, who had thus *mised, betrayed, and imposed* upon us, with *all their Tools* and *Abettors*, be they ever so numerous. This, we say, was *absolutely necessary*, if we desired to *create any Confidence* either in our *Allies*, if such we still have, or in our *People* at home: For otherwise, if we *screen* and *protect* the *Traytors*, whilst we *condemn* their *Treasons*; if we *suffer them* to enjoy with *Impunity* the *Fruits* of their *Villany*, whilst we are *groaning* under the *Misfortunes*

fortunes and Pressures occasioned by their pernicious Proceedings; if we allow them to revel in insolent Joy and Plenty, whilst the whole Nation are almost starving, and mourning their wretched Condition; we may talk of our Wisdom, we may boast of our Bravery, and we may prate if we please of our Liberty; but the first will be DESPISED, the second PITIED, and the third LAUGHED at by all Europe.

Come we now to the other Motive for engaging in the present War, namely, *that of restoring Peace in the Empire*; and let us see whether the Matter will be much mended? We are afraid not. In the first place, most of the Questions before asked, if not all of them, might again be repeated as properly here; and it would be equally difficult to give a satisfactory Answer thereto. Not only so, but, besides those, some other Objections might be started by an *ill-natured Querist*, which it would not be found an easy Task to remove. For Instance, How comes *Great Britain*, which, being an Island, can be but *remotely*, if at all *affected* thereby, to be *more concerned* in *re-establishing* the *Peace of the Empire*, than divers of the *Princes of Germany*, and even *some of the most powerful*; though their *Dominions* are *situated* therein; and, being *themselves Members* of it, their *Welfare* and *Safety* must be looked upon as *inseparable* from that of the *Germanick Body*; and yet seem to *trouble themselves very little* about the present War?

There are but two Ways by which this their indolent Behaviour can possibly be accounted for. The one, is by saying, That they do not apprehend the Safety of the *Empire* as a Body to be *at all in Danger* at this Juncture; and then it will follow of course, that we had no Business to interfere in the War. The other is, by *frankly confessing*, that, finding us to be *at all times so ready* to be the *Don Quixotes* and *Dupes* of *Europe*, they are *resolved* to lay *the whole Burden* upon us. Now, which of these may be the Case, we will not pretend to determine; but this we will venture to affirm, That, supposing the former to be the Truth, we are acting a *very imprudent Part*; and supposing it to be the latter, what-

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ever may be the Issue thereof, it will not redound much to our Honour or Interest to be constantly the Bubbles and Jack-pay-for-all's of every Power on the Continent. In effect, it is very evident it is in this Light our Neighbours at present look upon us. It would otherwise have been impossible that the Dutch, who, had the Queen of Hungary been overwhelmed, must infallibly have fallen a Sacrifice the next, could have remained so long such quiet and unconcerned Spectators of a War, on the Event of which their own Security immediately depended.

Having mentioned the Dutch, we cannot help making one Observation with regard to their Behaviour to us of late Years, which has equally raised our Astonishment and Indignation. It is this, that we have not been able to prevail on them to join with us in any one Measure, unless we should except the Suppression of the Ostend Company, (wherein they were more than equally concerned in point of Interest with ourselves), and in the present War, if they can properly be said as yet to have joined us. We say, this has equally raised our Indignation and Astonishment; the one, at the Slight put upon us, and the Indignity offered us, (not to mention their gross Ingratitude to a Nation which has so often prevented their being swallowed up); the other, that our incomparable Statesmen have never bethought themselves of a Way to compel them to it, and that almost at any time. Let but the Minister of Great Britain who resides at the Hague, declare peremptorily, in his Master's Name, That he will renounce all Alliance with them, and leave them to the Mercy of France, unless they will cordially espouse our Interests, and unite their Forces against our common Enemies, as the French ever were, and ever must be; and they will not stand long hesitating about it. In effect, they would then have but these two Ways to chuse; either to throw themselves directly into the Arms of France, and become a Province to her, or to join Heart and Hand with us; and which of these would be the most eligible, we leave any one to judge.

To return, however, from whence we have digressed, we would fain ask another Question, namely, How has the Empire deserved it at our Hands, that we should interest

interest ourselves so deeply in its Welfare? We confess we know of no Obligation we have to it, nor indeed of any we possibly can have. We know, on the contrary, that it owed its Safety to us at the ever-memorable Battle of *Hochstedt*; when our victorious Army defeated the ambitious Views of the common Enemy of Europe, at an infinite Expence both of Blood and Treasure; for which we were amply rewarded, no doubt, by a few bloody Rags, some of which still hang up in *Westminster Hall*. But how this Benefit conferred thereon by us at so dear a Rate, should lay us under a fresh Obligation of conferring more, and probably at as exorbitant a Price, we must own we cannot perceive.

In effect, who was it lighted up the Flames of War in the Empire, and carried Fire and Sword into the Dominions of the Queen of Hungary? Was it not the Elector of *Bavaria*, a Prince who has always been in the Interest of the common Enemy and Incendiary of Europe, and who has trode exactly in the Steps of his deceas'd Father? And did not the Empire nevertheless chuse this Prince as their Head, and thereby enable him the more to lay waste and spread Desolation through great Part of the Territories of her Hungarian Majesty? Did not most of the Princes assist the Emperor in so doing, and do not many still support him with Men or Money? Who then can they have to blame but themselves for the Ravage and Devastation of the Empire? And what Business have we to intermeddle therewith? Must they light up Fires, and must we be at the Expence and Trouble of extinguishing them? As to the Emperor himself, we think he is so far from being to be pitied, that we are of Opinion, he deserves yet worse than he has yet met with; and should not be sorry to see him reduced to take Refuge in *France*, as his Father did before him.

To speak the Truth, the House of *Bavaria* have for many Years been the never-failing Tools of the House of *Bourbon*; and though we bear no Ill-will to the *Bavarians* as a People, yet, as they are continually made the Instruments of their Prince's unjust Schemes to embroil Europe, and are thereby rendered subservient to the am-

bitious and wicked Designs of the Court of *Versailles*, we think it would be for the Benefit of *Chriftendom*, if both *they* and the *French* were almost *exterminated*, as the *Pests* of *Society* and *common Enemies* of *Mankind*. Perhaps this may found *very ill-natured* in the Ears of some People, and we may be censured as *highly inhumane*; but if they would weigh the Matter rightly, they would soon be convinced to the contrary, and would know we are governed in our Opinion by this equitable Rule,

————— *Nec Lex est justior ullâ,
Quàm necis artifices arte perire suâ.*

In effect, if either the *French* and *Bavarians*, or all the *rest of Europe*, must be ruined; if they have constantly endeavoured to *embroil all Chriftendom*; if the whole Tenor of their Conduct for many Years has been the same, and they have *never wanted the Will* when they have had the *Power*; if their Princes, within these fourscore Years, have been the Cause of *shedding as much Blood*, and *destroying as many Men*, as both their Dominions contain, (which we verily believe they have); and if their Subjects are always ready to execute their *very worst Commands*, we think it will hardly admit of any Dispute, which ought to suffer.

That we have not aggravated Matters in this Representation of the Case, will evidently appear, if we consider, how often within that Time they have called the *Turks* into the *Empire*, and what Numbers on both Sides lost their Lives on those Occasions; if we reflect likewise what Seas of Blood were shed by them, on account of the Succession to the Crown of *Spain*, whereon they perfidiously seized, contrary to all *Laws human and divine*; if we reflect on their *spiriting up* the *Spaniards* to seize on *Sicily* in 1718, the preventing of which has caused the War between them and us ever since; together with their *successful Invasion* of both *Naples*, *Sicily* and *Milan* in 1734, in conjunction with the Kings of *Spain* and *Sardinia*, whom they also drew into that War; their bribing the *Cardinal Primate* of *Poland*, with several of the *Grandeess*, to elect *Stanislaus*, though contrary to his

his Desire, merely to make his Election a *Bone of Contention*, and to set all *Europe* in a Flame; their *spiriting up* the *Swedes* since to fall upon the *Muscovites*, and the *Kings of Prussia and Poland*, with the *Electors of Bavaria*, to attack the *Queen of Hungary*: If we reflect on all these, we say, and the Millions of Lives lost on all Sides thereby, we shall find we have not exceeded the Bounds of Probability, in saying, the *French and Bavarians* have been the Occasion of destroying as many Men as both their Dominions contain. We have passed over their *perfidious Invasion* of the *Seven Provinces*, which they almost over-ran in the Reign of *Charles II.* and their *more perfidious and inhumane Behaviour*, on pretence of being Mediators, in *Corfica*, with the Blood shed on those Occasions, because we would not *inflame the Reckoning*.

To return then from whence we have again digressed, we have seen that, whether our engaging in the present War be ascribed to our Desire of *supporting the Queen of Hungary*, or of *restoring Peace to the Empire*, our Conduct must appear both *weak and unaccountable* to all *sensible and unprejudiced Persons*. Neither would the Matter be much mended, should we add a third Motive, and say, it was necessary, to *prevent the Overthrow of the Balance of Power in Europe*; because it is *notoriously known*, that the *whole Tenor of our Conduct*, for above these twenty Years, has had a *visible Tendency to aggrandize France*, and *weaken the House of Austria*; which every one, who did not *wilfully shut his Eyes* against Conviction, was sensible could not fail of *effectually destroying the Balance of Power*.

This was *so manifest*, that some Persons have pretended to account for it, by saying, that the *Greatness of the Austrian Family* was *look'd upon with invidious Eyes* by a certain *G-r-m-n Prince*; that he was therefore desirous of *bringing it down to his own Level*; and that he found the Means to prevail upon our *M——ry* to join with him in this *detestable and destructive Project*; which has accordingly been put in Execution but *too successfully*. We must own, were we to judge by Appearances, and the present Posture of Affairs, we should be tempted to believe this;
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but then, we can't help thinking, that an *Impeachment* must have been the *necessary Consequence* of our *Change of Measures*, were it only to *vindicate* the *Nation in general*, from having *consented* to a *Design* so *execrable*, and so *contrary* to our *true Interest*: As no such thing therefore has been attempted, we must conclude there are no *Grounds* for such a *Suggestion*.

Neither would we willingly believe there is any more *Foundation* for another, which has been industriously whispered about, and has gained some *Credit*; namely, That the *Advantage* and *Welfare* of a certain *El——te* has been of *more Weight*, and *more consulted*, in our *Measures* at this *Juncture*, than the *Interest* and *Prosperity* of *Great Britain*; because it would necessarily follow, that even the present *Pilots* of the *State* were but *little less criminal* than *those in former Times*; and consequently that we are scarce any way the *Gainers* by the *Change*.

What gave *Rise* to this *Suggestion*, we suppose was this, that the *People*, not being able to account for our late *Conduct*, and particularly for *one Step*, which they thought *wholly inconsistent* with the *Interest* of these *Kingdoms*, were willing to ascribe it to the *Regard* some *Persons* had for a *certain Country*, for whose *Advantage alone* it seemed calculated. But they never considered, that though *such a Regard* might be *very excusable* and *natural* in *those Persons*, it was *quite the reverse*, and *absolutely unpardonable* in *some others*; because it shewed they were utterly *unmindful* and *regardless* of the *Welfare* of another *Country*, for which they were bound, by the strictest *Ties* of *Duty* and *Nature*, to have the *most tender Concern*.

We chuse, therefore, rather to suspend our *Judgment*, till we can have better *Information* what were the *real Motives* which induced us now to *engage so precipitately* in a *War* upon the *Continent*, than be *guilty* of *passing a rash Censure* upon the *Counsels* of *those* for whose *Wisdom* and *Integrity* we would willingly retain the utmost *Veneration*. But, nevertheless, we cannot help observing, it is *somewhat amazing* the *present Land-war*, wherein we are as yet only *Auxiliaries*, should have so much *ingrossed* all our *Care* and *Attention*, that the *War* with *Spain*, where-
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in we are Principals, and in the *Success* whereof we are infinitely more nearly concerned, should be wholly neglected, and in a manner forgot. It must be confessed, to our eternal Honour, that we are certainly the most generous and disinterested Nation that ever was, in thus preferring the Advantage of our Allies to our own. We should be glad if we could see any of them who were fond of following our Example; but they are wiser than to imitate us in such *Knight-errantry*.

Will it be said, in *Justification* of this strange and unaccountable Conduct, that the whole Nation called out loudly upon us, to assist her Hungarian Majesty? Supposing it should be granted, would this be a sufficient Excuse? Not in the least. We own it was a very popular Measure; we own the Britons, who are naturally a brave and generous People, could not bear to see that injured and gallant Princess so basely and unjustly oppressed and overwhelmed by such Numbers of treacherous and cowardly Enemies, who, without any Provocation, invaded her Dominions on all Sides with Fire and Sword, without wishing Providence might raise her up some Protector to support her Cause. But does this prove we desired so many British Regiments should be transported to Flanders, at an infinite Expence; and that we should take sixteen thousand Hanoverians into our Pay, almost a Year before we wanted them, to fight in a manner their own Quarrel? We say, their own Quarrel; for, that they were much more nearly concerned therein than we, no body can deny. As little does it prove, that we were willing our own Interest should be entirely neglected, or postponed; or that, while we are maintaining a powerful Squadron in the Mediterranean, for the Protection of the Territories of Sardinia and Tuscany, the Spaniards should be suffered, almost unmolested, to take our Merchant-ships, and every Week should bring an Account of fresh Captures; which might long ago have been prevented, in a great measure, by sending a small Squadron to St. Sebastian's, to demolish that Nest of Pyrates; or, at least, to burn all the Privateers in that Harbour.

No; this was such preposterous Conduct as could never have

have been foreseen, or, if it had, would never have been approved of. We grant, we were willing the Queen of Hungary should be assisted; but then it was by timely Remittances in Money, with which she could have hired Troops, not only at a much easier Rate than we possibly can, but such Troops as she might have had much sooner, and which, being absolutely at her own Command, would have done her much more effectual Service than any others. In the mean while, if we were willing to go yet farther, a formidable Fleet might have made a powerful Diversion, by keeping the Coasts of France in a continual Alarm: Which would at once have answered two good Ends; one, by obliging them to keep a large Body of Forces upon their Sea-coasts, and interrupting their Commerce, which of itself would have been highly advantageous to us; the other, by scouring our Channel, and securing our Merchant-ships from any Spanish Privateers, or, which is as bad, from the French under the Disguise of Spaniards. We might add a third Advantage, which would have resulted to us from so judicious and prudent a Conduct; namely, we should either not have heard of the refortifying Dunkirk, in express Violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, or might have effectually prevented it by a timely Visit before it had been too far advanced. There was yet another way of distressing the French, which would have galled them considerably; and that is, by procuring Commissions from her Hungarian Majesty to fit out Privateers under her Colours; which would nevertheless have been no Breach of Peace, nor any more than the *Lex Talionis*, as they have done the same by us several Times.

We confess indeed, if we must always be burdened with the same numerous Land-army as of late Years, we should chuse much rather to have them employed in fighting for our Allies abroad, than in spreading Idleness and Debauchery by their Examples at home throughout the Kingdom. But it was expected long ago, that we should have been relieved from this Grievance; and though no Ease could be obtained during the Influence of our late Grand Vizier, it was generally believed this would have been the agreeable first Fruits of a Change;
nay,

may, though we found ourselves *disappointed herein*, no body *doubted* but it would have been *complied with*, before it was attempted to *lay any farther Load* upon the *Publick* in favour of any *Ally* whatever; so willing were we to *wait with Patience*, and not be *too precipitate* in censuring.

To our Sorrow, however, we were *mistaken egregiously*, and have seen a Change of Hands with *very little Alteration of Measures*: So *contagious* is a *bad Example*! especially when *no Punishment* has been *inflicted* on the first *Offender*. Nevertheless, though we have taken *one false Step*, and there is no *Likelihood* we should *recede* from it, at least, if we are *guided* by the same *wise Counsels* as of late, till the *Back* of the Nation is *quite broken*, we will venture to *lay it down* as an *unalterable Maxim* with respect to these Kingdoms, That, whenever we would *exert our natural Strength* to the *greatest Advantage*, and *annoy our Enemies* the most with the *least Expence* and *Hazard* to ourselves, we must begin with *disbanding our Land-forces*, and *taking off* our most *burdensome Taxes*. We must, then, necessarily reign *Lords of the Ocean*; and though our *own Trade* might *labour* under some *Difficulties*, (which is the *constant Effect* of *War*), that of our *Neighbours* would *labour* under yet more; which would make them *soon willing* to give us *reasonable Satisfaction*.

In effect, the Case is widely altered between us and the *French* since the *late War*. During that we had a *pretty flourishing Trade*, and the *French scarce any*; so that we had a *great deal* to *lose*, and *scarce any Thing* to *get*: (And yet, even then, by a *right Management*, we might have made them *soon weary of it*): Whereas now, as they are our *Rivals*, and that too *successfully* in most of our *Branches of Trade*, (wherein they have in a great measure *supplanted us*), they have *as much, or more* to *lose*, than we, and, by reason of our *Superiority at Sea*, must *necessarily suffer the most*. If we must engage in a *War*, therefore, at any *Time*, (which, as has been already shewn, we ought never to do, but for the *Prevention* of a greater *Evil*, as the *Interruption* of our *Commerce* or *Violation* of our *just Rights*), let us carry it on in such a *Manner* as to

annoy our *Enemies the most*, and that with the *least Hazard and Expence*, and the *greatest Probability of Advantage* to ourselves.

Should we not think any Man *little better than mad*, who, being *himself* but of *small Stature*, and *weak*, and having a *Quarrel to decide* with an *Adversary of twice his Strength*, (with whom, however, he could *very well cope* either at *Small-sword* or with *Fire-arms*), if, having it in his Power to *chuse his Weapons*, he should *decline using those* which rendered him a *Match* for his *Antagonist*, and *vain-gloriously, rashly and foolishly*, should offer to *engage him at Fifty-cuffs*, wherein the other had *visibly* the Odds on his Side? Should we not say such an *obstinate Wretch* was *infatuated*, and *highly deserved* to be *heartily drubbed*, in order to bring him to his Senses? This would certainly be the Opinion of every reasonable Man; nor would any one either *assist or pity him*, though *reduced* to the *most deplorable Condition*, but bid him *thank himself*. Just as *weak and absurd is the Conduct* of Great Britain in *engaging in a War by Land* with any Power upon the *Continent*.

But perhaps it will be said, we could not any other Way *so effectually support her Hungarian Majesty*; and that we were *bound to assist her as Guarantees of the Pragmatick Sanction*. Let us examine, therefore, what Truth there would be in such a Suggestion. Supposing then a *timely Remittance of two Millions of Florins* over and above what has already been granted her, had been made to that *glorious Princess* at the *Beginning of the War*; and supposing the *Hanoverians* had *paid their own Troops*, which, as *their Country* is more *nearly concerned* in the *Event* thereof than ours, they ought to have done: Supposing we in the mean while had sent a *powerful Squadron*, with *five or six thousand Soldiers*, and a *proper Number of Bomb-ketches*, to keep the *Sea-coasts of France* in a *continual Alarm*, and carry *Terror and Desolation* where-ever they appeared; would not *such a Diversion*, with the *infinite Damage* they might have done, and the *almost total Interruption* of their *Commerce*, have obliged the *French* to send *such Numbers* to man their *Coasts* as would

would have *weakened their Army* more than any other Measure we can take? This, we believe, will hardly be disputed; but *Forefight* and *sound Policy* are very seldom the *Characteristicks* of a *B—t—sh M—y*.

Accordingly we saw ours continue *wholly unconcerned* and *indolent*, whilst the Kings of *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia*, in conjunction, invaded the Dominions of our *ancient Ally* the *Emperor* on every Side, stript him of all his Possessions in *Italy*, and reduced him to the last Extremity; to extricate himself from which, his *Imperial Majesty* was forced to agree to the Cession of the Dutchy of *Lorrain* to *France*; to which he had prevailed on the Duke to consent, in consideration of his Marriage with the Archdutchess, now *Queen of Hungary*, and the eventual Succession to the Dutchy of *Tuscany*. This *considerable Aggrandizement* of our *natural Enemy*, they beheld, we say, with the utmost *Unconcern*, at the same time that they saw the *Balance of Power* in *Europe* entirely *overthrown*, by the so great *weakening* of the *House of Austria*, in the *Loss* of *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*. All this did our then *worthy Ministry* look on with *Indifference*, whilst the *Prostitutes*, whom they kept in pay to cast a *Mist* before the Eyes of the People, and *poison* their Minds, were not *ashamed* to be daily *inveighing* against the Treaty of *Utrecht*, for having left the *House of Bourbon* too *formidable*, and not having *sufficiently* provided for the *Balance of Power*.

But, submitting it to *wiser Heads*, and to those whom it may more immediately concern, by *what Motives* those *Gentlemen* were influenced at that time, we shall now proceed to consider what we at first proposed; namely, What must be the *probable Consequences* of our engaging in a *Land-war*? And, in order to set this in a clearer Light, we shall examine, *first*, Whether any Advantages can possibly accrue to us from thence? and *secondly*, What Detriment we may in all Likelihood apprehend from it? As to the former, we defy all Mankind to point out one single Advantage we can reap from it. We may, indeed, gain Victories and take Towns; but will this be of any Service to ourselves? No; the *Expence of Blood* and

Treasure will be left to us, as has always been in former Wars, whilst the *Benefit* will redound solely to our *Allies*.

In short, it would puzzle any one to say, *what Benefit* we can *propose* to *ourselves* from this extraordinary Step. Will it *increase* or *extend* our *Trade*? No one will have the Impudence to affirm it. Will it *enrich* the *Nation*? Quite the contrary; it will *greatly impoverish* us, by *continually draining* from us our *Money* and our most useful *Hands*. Will it *secure* us from the *Depredations* of the *Spaniards*, or *obtain better Terms* for us from those haughty and cruel *Enemies*? Just the reverse; whilst we are *exerting* our whole *Strength* in support of the *Queen of Hungary*, at the *Expence* of our best *Blood* and *Treasure*, they will have the fairest *Opportunity* to exert themselves, by *redoubling* their *Outrages*, and putting their *Possessions* in *America* into such a Condition as *not to fear any Insults*: So that, in proportion as we grow weaker, they will grow stronger; and consequently will be the less likely to recede from their insolent *Pretensions*. What a *hopeful Prospect* is this for *Great Britain*! If then a *Land-war* will neither *extend* our *Trade*, *enrich* the *Nation*, *secure* us from the *Depredations* and *Insults* of our *Enemies*, nor *obtain* us any better *Terms* from them; what *Advantage*, in the Name of Wonder, do we *propose* to *ourselves* from thence?

Perhaps it may be answered, we shall *obtain honourable Terms* for her *Hungarian Majesty*; after which we shall be at Liberty to *exert* ourselves in our own *Behalf*, and *push on* the *War* with *Vigour* against the *Spaniards*. Shall we so! We are heartily glad of it truly! We thought, however, in *common Prudence*, we ought first to have *taken care* of our own *Concerns*; and then to have considered about *assisting* our *Allies*. But what have a *generous, disinterested British M——y* to do with *common Prudence*? And yet, what would they say to a Man, who, when *his own House*, and that of a *distant Neighbour*, were both in a *Flame* at the same time, should run to help to *extinguish* the latter, and leave his own to be *consumed*? Should not they and all the *World* pronounce him a *Madman*? And are not we now *acting* the *very same Part*?

Part ? In effect, supposing we were not only to obtain the *most honourable Terms* for the *Queen of Hungary*, (which yet is somewhat doubtful), but should *be so successful* as to recover for her *all the House of Austria* have lost within these ten Years; *what* would this *avail us*, if our *own Nation* is *impoverished*, our *most able-bodied Men* exhausted, and our *Commerce irretrievably lost*? All of which are the *probable Consequences* of our engaging *now* in a *Land-war*. We say of engaging *now*, because we must engage at ten Times the *Disadvantage* we did formerly in *Queen Anne's Reign*; as will be shewn presently in its proper Place.

But perhaps it may be said, we may possibly *enlarge our Dominions*, by obtaining *some Territories* on the Continent, which may *add to the Splendor* of our Crown, and give *more Weight* to our *Influence*, whether we are to *declare War*, or enter into *Negotiations* with any of our neighbouring Potentates. Our Answer is, *Heaven forbid* so wild a Thought should ever find Entrance into our Brains. We know but of *one Place*, besides what we already have on the *whole Continent of Europe*, which could be of *any Service* to us; and that is *Dunkirk*; which cannot fail of proving a *great Thorn* in our Sides, whilst in the Hands of the *French*, in case of Rupture: And even that *our good Allies* would never assist us to reduce; they would not, in all the late *glorious and successful War*, though we were then continually adding, *not only Towns*, but *whole Provinces* to their Dominions. Besides, we would fain ask, *what Weight* have the *German Territories* under the Government of our Sovereign given at any Time to our Measures?

We have found them indeed of *some Weight*, but then it has been to *our Disadvantage*. They have been of *sufficient Weight* to draw away from us, *too frequently*, the *Persons* of our Princes; we hope not their *Affections*, nor our *Treasures*; though even that has been *often suggested*: But we are far from giving any Credit to it. Nay, it has been *pretty publicly* insinuated by many, that they have been a *dead Weight* to us on several Occasions, by *preventing us* from *exerting ourselves* for our *own true Interest*,

rest, whenever it has been thought *incompatible* with that of those *favourite P-f-f-si-ns*; and drawing us into Measures altogether *inconsistent* with our own *Welfare*. Some have even *pretended* to account by this means for most of our Measures of late Years; for which otherwise no *tolerable Reason* could be assigned. Accordingly, to this they ascribe the Treaty of *Hanover*, which threw us into the Arms of *France*, our *natural Enemy*, and *astonished all Mankind*; in order to reduce the *exorbitant Power* of the *Emperor*, which, say they, gave *Umbrage* to a certain *El——or*; and was therefore to be *brought lower*. To this likewise they ascribe the *memorable Treaty* of *Seville*, which stipulated the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* into *Tuscany*, and paved the Way for the *Revolution* which happened soon after, and stript his *Imperial Majesty* of all his *Possessions* in *Italy*. To this also they ascribe our *continuing inactive*, though the *Emperor* was not only attacked, at once, by *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia* in *Italy*, but in *Germany* also by the former, and reduced to the last Extremity.

Nay, they pretend to account hereby even for our present Conduct, and say, our engaging so heartily at present, is owing to the *Resentment* of a *Visit* made by *Maillebois* to a certain *El——te*; and the Fear that another Prince of the *Empire* may grow *too powerful* in his turn, if the *Queen of Hungary* should be *reduced too low*. We are far, however, from giving Credit to any of these Suggestions; because it has ever been received, as an *undeniable Maxim* in Politicks, to which there has never heretofore been found an Exception, that when a smaller State is united to a greater, so as to come under the Dominion of the same Prince, the smaller must of course become dependent upon the greater, as the latter must necessarily be the Seat of Empire: Whereas, should we believe these Insinuations, the *Influence* of the *lesser Dominion* has always been *too strong* for that of the *greater*, and has occasioned *such Alterations* in the *Political System* of *Europe*, as *could never have been foreseen*, and *would not have been believed*, if *prophefied*.

However, be this as it will, and leaving these Matters to

to be decided by others, as being above our Sphere, thus much is certain, that any Possessions on the Continent must be *bigly prejudicial* to *Great Britain*; as they would deprive us of the *most considerable Benefits* we enjoy thro' our *happy Situation*; which are, that no Power can *invade us*, but at an *infinite Disadvantage*; and that we need not be *involved* in any of the *Quarrels* between our Neighbours on the Continent unless *we please*; and, even then, it need only be upon our *own Terms*. Any Possessions, therefore, on the main Land, which were not considerable enough to support themselves, in case of being attacked, either by their own Strength, or through the Means of *natural Allies*, who are *interested* in their Preservation, would be so far from *proving beneficial*, that they might, in Time, *be fatal* to us, by being *perpetual Drains* of our *Treasure*, and drawing us into so many Disputes, on their Account, as might *cost us more* than the Value of their whole Fee-simple might be able to defray.

Even GIBRALTAR, the only Place we have, or we hope ever shall have, upon the Continent of *Europe*, would not be worth our keeping, were it not *impregnable* by Land, and *easily relieved*, in case of a Siege, as long as we are *Masters of the Sea*: Nor would *Dunkirk* be worth our Acceptance, if offered us, but that it might be rendered so on the Land-side, by laying the Country around it under Water whenever we pleased; and might defy all Attacks by Sea, whilst we *reign Sovereigns* of the *Channel*, which we flatter ourselves will be till Time is no more. The *former*, therefore, of these Fortresses, as it *secures us* the *Command* of the *Streights*, that *important Inlet* into the *Mediterranean*, is of infinite Value, and might be rendered of *prodigious Service* to us, though we can't say it has hitherto been of much, by a *prudent Conduct*: And the *latter*, had we been suffered to keep it, in the Condition it was then in, as we might have done, at the *Peace of Utrecht*, had we had an *honest Ministry*, by rendering us *absolute Masters* of *both Sides* of the *Channel*, would have *secured us*, in a great measure, from the *Depredations* and *Insults* of our Enemies, under our very
Noses,

Noses, if we may use that Expression; nor should we have heard of so many *half French, half Spanish* Privateers, who have *lain in wait to snap up our Merchant-men* almost at *our own Doors*. UNHAPPY BRITONS! scarce ever to have *one Ministry* who have *consulted your true Interest!*

It was generally expected, upon the Dismission of our late *State-Leviathan*, that we should have seen *better Times*, and that *more salutary Measures* would have been followed; but, by what Fatality it has been prevented, we know not, we have been hitherto *disappointed*: We are willing, however, still to hope that Things will soon take a *more favourable Turn* for these *unfortunate Kingdoms*, and that the *inauspicious and baneful Planet*, or rather CONSTELLATION, which has lately been *predominant*, and shed its *malevolent Influences* over the *British Counsels*, will be quickly *banished our Horizon*, by the propitious Conjunction of *Saturn, Jupiter and Mercury*, in a *Trine Aspect*, portending *Peace, Plenty, Content, and unclogg'd Liberty*, (with a *flourishing and extended Commerce*, free from all *Restrains and heavy Duties*), to these *once more happy Realms*.

All these Blessings, great as they are, would be the *necessary Consequences* of *wise Measures*; as the very *reverse* will always be the Effect of *weak and imprudent Undertakings*: How maturely ought we then to weigh all our Steps, when *so prodigious* is the Difference between a *well regulated Conduct* and the contrary! *Good Management and Forecast* is of as much *Consequence* in *publick Affairs* as in *private Life*; and what should we say to a Man, who, being about to engage in any Business, did not first sit down and consider, whether his *Gains* were *likely* to be more than *tantamount* to his *Losses*, and the *Expence* of carrying it on? Should we not reckon him *very weak and unadvised*? Undoubtedly we should! How much more then should we deem him so, who should *embark in any Affair*, wherein his *probable Gains* were *not only highly unlikely* ever to make a *near Compensation* for his *Losses*, and the *Charge of Management*, but wherein the *least Miscarriage or ill Success* might *possibly* be attended with the *most fatal Effects*?

We

We have *more than human Authority* to justify us, in *blaming* the Conduct of that Prince, who, being *able* to raise but an Army of *ten thousand Men*, should think of coping with another who could bring *twenty thousand* against him: And were it not that *few Statesmen* trouble their Heads with the Scripture, we could with those *Counsellors*, who *advised* us to *engage so precipitately* in the *present Land-war*, after we had *so long* continued *quiet Spectators* thereof, and suffered her *Hungarian Majesty* to be *so greatly weaken'd*, (which might have been *prevented by timely Assistance*), had first read *Luke xiv. 31. 32.* and *calmly weigh'd* it. But perhaps it may be answered, There is no Similitude between our Case at present, and that of the King there mentioned; that our Army is at least *equal*, if not *superior*, to that of our *Enemies*; and that we have already shewn we are able to cope with them. Suppose we should grant this, what then! Supposing, instead of a *drawn Battle*, or a *Victory*, which the *French* still dispute with us, we had *undeniably gained the better*, and had killed them *ten thousand Men*, whilst we had lost but *half the Number*; would this have been *any great matter of Triumph* to us? Are not our *Enemies able to support ten such Defeats*? On the contrary, should not we be pretty much in the same Case with the *famous Pyrrhus*, King of *Epirus*, who, after having gained an *indisputable Advantage* over the *Romans*, but at a *dear Rate*, and being *complimented* thereon by his *Officers and Courtiers*, very wisely answered, *Such another Victory would UNDO me.*

In effect, though we will not affirm, that we should not be able to *bear up* under one or two *dear-bought Victories*, or even as many *Defeats*; yet we will venture to submit it to the *serious Consideration* of any thinking and impartial Person, whether, supposing this War were to be *equally successful* with that in the *immortal, glorious, Queen Anne's* Reign, (which, by the by, is highly improbable), there is *any likelihood* a Nation, *already sinking* under the *intolerable Load* of *such heavy Taxes* as we pay, should be able to support it? Or whether the *Queen of Hungary's* *already impoverished, and almost depopulated Dominions*, and her *exhausted Finances*, can be *any great Assistance* to us, should the War be protracted to any Length of Time? And, if we are nei-

ther able of ourselves, nor, with the Help of her *Hungarian* Majesty, to support the Burthen of a consuming Land-war for any Continuance, we would beg our Countrymen seriously to consider what we are about.

Perhaps it will be answered, We shall be joined likewise by the *Dutch*, and it may be by the King of *Prussia*. Supposing this were so, would this mend Matters mightily? We are afraid not. As to the *States-General*, it is well known how unwilling they were to engage with us at all, if they can be said to have engaged yet; which is to be doubted: And, as to his *Prussian* Majesty, we are apprehensive his Friendship is of so very late standing, that it is as yet pretty much to be suspected. Besides, should we for once grant, that they would now engage heartily on our Side, which is much to be questioned, especially of the *Dutch*, so greatly do they stand in Awe of their too formidable Neighbours the *French*; does not every one see it would be only upon their own Terms? And how advantageous this would be to us, we leave every one to judge who has but the least Knowledge of that artful, politick and self-interested People.

They call themselves a Nation of Traders, and not without good Reason; for such will every one find them who has any Dealings with them. They treat, as a State, in the same Manner as each Individual does in his private Capacity. Just so much for your Penny, and no more, will you get of Hans behind his Counter; and just as much for your Penny, and no more, will you obtain of their High Mightinesses, when assembled in a Body. Accordingly, we shall be sure to have almost the whole Burthen of the War thrown upon us, whilst the *Dutch*, by the Remittances which must pass through their Hands, and the great Circulation of Money our Army will occasion in the Low Countries, will be little or no Sufferers. Nay, should all Intercourse between us and the *French* be stopt, as must be, in case we become Principals in the War, (which now seems unavoidable), they may possibly be Gainers thereby; since we shall not be able to procure either *French* Wines, Brandies, Brocades, Silks, or Cambricks, those Articles of Luxury we now have directly from *France*, (and from which our Publick-spirited Nobility

ity and Gentry will not abstain, though the Safety or Ruin of the Nation depended thereon), but by the way of *Holland*; as the *French*, on the other hand, must be beholden to the *Dutch*, for all the *English Commodities* they want.

We have seen, then, that the *Accession* of the *Dutch* to our Measures will be of *very little Benefit* to us; and as for his *Prussian Majesty*, should he join his Troops to ours, it is very certain he would expect a *considerable Subsidy*; and from whence, in the name of Wonder, is all the Money to come? Had we acted, indeed, as our *prudent Neighbours* did, and as every *wise Nation* would, during above *twenty Years Peace*, that we enjoyed, or at least *might have enjoyed*, had we so pleased; had we improved, we say, that *happy Opportunity*, after their Example, by *easing the Subject* in every possible respect; by *taking off* all the most *burdensome Taxes*; by giving *all manner of Encouragement* to our *Manufactures* and *American Colonies*; by *keeping up* no *useless Land-forces* at home, and granting no *unnecessary Subsidies* for *foreign Troops* abroad; by *fitting out* no *peaceable Squadrons* for *Raree-shews* and *Ridicule*; by *retrenching* all *needless Expences*, and *paying off*, as fast as possible, all the *publick Debts*, especially such as were *most grievous* to the *industrious Poor*: Had we done all this, we say once again, we might *probably, now*, have been in a Condition to have engaged in *another Ten Years Land-war*, had it been *absolutely necessary*; which can hardly ever be our Case, *Thanks to divine Providence!* But after a *Peace*, such as we did enjoy; a *Peace!* with all the *Inconveniencies*, and none of the *Advantages of War!* a *Peace!* wherein we *paid yearly as much in Taxes* as during the War in *Queen Anne's Reign*, and sometimes more! a *Peace!* wherein we *kept up a more numerous Army*, and *fitted out more formidable Fleets* than during that *whole glorious Period!* and yet a *Peace!* during which we suffered the *most outrageous Insults!* a *Peace!* in short, whereof it may be truly said,

*In vain the HARRASS'D Britons hop'd for EASE,
Whilst growing Taxes were the Fruits of PEACE:*

After such a *Peace!* we say, wherein we *connived* at the *Reparation* of the Harbour of *Dunkirk*, at our *Wool's* being *openly conveyed* from us, and our *Men enlisted* into the Ser-

vice of the *French*, for *fear* of *provoking* them; in short, a *Peace*! during which we have suffered *almost every Branch* of our *Trade* to be *lost*, whilst scarce a *Penny* of our *Debts* have been paid off, what *Probability* is there of our *bearing up* under a tedious *Land-war*? It would be mere *Madness* to think of it.

In effect, we must commence a *War* at present at ten times the *Disadvantage* as *formerly*; we are not only *much weaker*, but our *Enemies much stronger*, than in the *Reigns* of King *William*, or our late *excellent Queen*. At that *Juncture*, his present *Catholick Majesty*, *Philip V.* was but *just advanced* to the *Throne* of *Spain*; and there was a *powerful Party* in the *Kingdom*, who were *not very well satisfied* with his *Promotion*; but were disposed to *revolt* as soon as they could be assured of being supported, which they accordingly did. But the *Case* is quite different now, when the *Spaniards* have been accustomed to his *Sway* above forty *Years*, and the *Crown* is *firmly settled* on his *Head*: Add to this, that these his *Subjects* having been *inured to War*, for a long *Term* of *Years*, there are now several thousands of *hardy Veterans* and *excellent Officers* amongst them; whereas they were before almost as *wretched Soldiers* as the *Portuguese*.

Again, by the late *unfortunate Cession* of *Lorrain*, (which was, in a great measure, owing to our *Supineness* and *Indolence*), *France* has acquired an *undoubted Right* to that *fertile* and *rich Dutchy*, the *Possession* of which, by reason of its *bappy Situation*, is of *infinite Importance*. In effect, it is not only a *considerable Addition*, in point of *Strength*, to the *French Crown*, as it can raise and maintain 25,000 *Men*; but as it secures their *Frontier* on that *Side* where it was most exposed; and may be made at the same time a *Key* to let the *Armies* of *France* into the *Empire* when they please, and before the *Germans* can have any notice of their *Design*, or put themselves in a *Posture* of *Defence*. By the *Accession* therefore of this *Dutchy*, it is evident, that *France* is much more powerful than at the *Beginning* of the late *War*; and, if she was then able to support a *constant Series* of *ill Success*, and so many *signal Defeats*, for *ten Years*, what may she not now do? Yet again, the *French* at that *Time* had little or *no Trade*; and consequently were *less able* to bear such *terrible*

rible Overtbrows, and the *heavy Taxes* their Prince was thereby necessitated to lay upon them : Whereas they have now a very *flourishing* and *extended Commerce*, infomuch that they have in a great measure *supplanted us* in divers of the *most beneficial* Branches thereof, particularly in our Trade to *Spain*, *Turky*, and the *Levant*.

But to add to our Misfortune, the *French* are not only *much stronger* than they were at the Beginning of the late War, but we are *much weaker* in several respects. We were not only *heartily assisted* then by the *Emperor*, the *Dutch*, and the *Duke of Savoy* ; but by *Denmark*, and the several Princes of the *Empire*, as *Prussia*, *Saxony*, *Hanover*, &c. ; and, which was no *inconsiderable Advantage*, our Armies were then *headed* by a *Marlborough* and an *Eugene*, that is, *two* of the *greatest Generals* the World ever produced. Besides, *our Trade* was then in a very *prosperous Condition*, and we had no *Rivals* of any *Consequence* therein ; so that it was a *continual Source* of *Riches* to us, and *enabled us* to support many *heavy Taxes* ; and, to crown all, *our Debts* were then but *very trifling*.

Whilst we were in this *happy State*, neither *overburdened* with *Debts*, nor *grievous Taxes*, the *inseparable Consequences* thereof, it was no wonder, if we did venture to *engage* in a *Land-war* ; especially when it was not only to prevent all *Europe's* being over-run by *France*, but to oppose the *Imposition* of a *bigotted Tyrant* upon us ; and *revenge* a most *unpardonable Affront* to the late Queen, by proclaiming the *Pretender rightful Sovereign* of these Kingdoms, in *direct Violation* of the Treaty of *Ryswick*. These, it must be owned by all, were *notorious Provocations*, and *very urgent Reasons* for *exerting ourselves* in an extraordinary Manner ; and yet, every one knows, when that War was spun out to a *great Length*, how *heartily weary* the Nation grew of it, and what *Clamours* it occasioned ; notwithstanding the *Glory* we were every Day acquiring, (a Thing highly agreeable to the *British Nation*), and the *unparalleled* and *uninterrupted Success* that attended our Arms.

In effect, what did *Great Britain* gain by that *Profusion* of *Blood* and *Treasure* so *prodigally lavished* in that War ? Are *Gibraltar* and *Portmakon* an Equivalent for the thousands

lands of brave Men who lost their Lives, and above a hundred Millions of Money expended therein? Don't we *still* grone under the *intolerable Pressure* of the *Debts* contracted on that Occasion? And are we now entering upon *Measures*, which *must* probably cost us *as much more*? Must not the Consequence be *inevitable Ruin*? And, after we are *well drained* of our Men and Money, and the *little Trade* we have left is *entirely lost*, (as it must be in all likelihood), must we not of course *fall an easy Prey* to the *first Invader*? Such is the *melancholy Scene* we have now before us.

Our *gracious Sovereign*, who has been made constantly to *believe*, that we are a *very rich and flourishing People*, that *Great Britain* is an *inexhaustible Mine of Wealth*, and that *all Opposition* to his *Measures* (as all the *most pernicious ministerial Schemes* have been *modestly called*) proceeded solely from our *enjoying too much Liberty and Plenty*, is not apprised of the *wretched Condition* of his *faithful Subjects*; but, in all Probability, imagines us to be *naturally a turbulent, dissatisfied, and even seditious Nation*. Nor is this any Wonder, if we *consider* for how many Years he was suffered to *see only through the Eyes*, and to *hear only through the Ears*, of ONE, who was *demonstrably* in an *open Conspiracy* against the *Liberties and Prosperity* of his Country. When we consider this, we say, and at the same time *reflect*, that even the *most destructive* of his *Measures*, the *Excise-scheme*, if common Report may be credited, was represented to his Majesty as a *most salutary and beneficial Project*, calculated purely to prevent the *most notorious Frauds*, and *improve the publick Revenue*; and that it was *rendered abortive* only by a *Combination* of STURDY BEGGARS, grown *wanton* through *too much Affluence*; wanting to be *humbled*; and supported by a *disaffected Party* in *both Houses*: Where is the Wonder if our Prince, who judges of others by his own *noble and generous Soul*, should be *prepossessed* with *Notions not much to our Advantage*, and should think we are well able to bear the *Expence and Burthen* of the *present Land-war*?

But, were he made *truly* acquainted with the *real State* of these unhappy Kingdoms; that they are so far from being *capable of struggling* with any *fresh Load*, that they are already just *sinking* under the *Weight* of their present *heavy Taxes*;

Taxes; and that the least *additional Pressure* must infallibly put the *finishing Stroke* to their *Ruin*: That a *Land-war* is of all Measures the *most likely* to complete our *Destruction*, as it must *necessarily impoverish* and *infeeble* us the most, by being a *continual Drain* both of our *Treasure* and *most able-bodied Men*; whereas, in a *Sea-war*, much the greatest Part of the Provision, and all the *Warlike Stores*, are taken in at *home*, or sent after the Fleet in *Tenders*; and the Ships being constantly paid off in our own Ports, the Money is always expended *amongst* ourselves, which creates a *quick Circulation* and *brisk inland Trade*; two Circumstances *highly worthy* the *Consideration* of an *almost exhausted People*: Add to this, that in the *most bloody* and *unfortunate Sea-war* we ever engaged in, the *yearly loss* of *Sailors* was never *near equal* to that of *Soldiers*, in any one of the Campaigns under K. William, the Duke of Marlborough, or in *Spain*; on the contrary, that, generally speaking, it never required *half the Number* of Seamen to recruit the Navy, as it did of Landmen to repair the *Losses* of the Army:

Were his Majesty, we say, made *fully sensible* of this our *wretched Condition*, and of all these *Disadvantages* of a *Land-war*, as also of the *great Advantage* our Superiority by Sea gives us over our Enemies; we are well assured, he is a Prince of so much *Humanity* and *Prudence*, as likewise so *tenderly concerned* for the *Welfare* of his *People*, he would never engage us in a Step which must necessarily prove so *fatal* to us, should the War be protracted to any Length. In effect, though we are aware this Position will be thought *very odd* by most Folks, we will venture to affirm, that it is neither the *true Interest* of his Majesty himself, nor of his *German Dominions*, to involve *Great Britain* in a *consuming Land-war*; on the contrary, that even the *Safety* of the former is now dependent, in some measure, upon the *Welfare* of the latter; or, in other Words, that the *Ruin* of these *Kingdoms* must *necessarily* and *inevitably* draw after them the *Ruin* of the *Electorate of Hanover*, with all the Territories annexed thereto.

To make this plain, we shall only observe, what has been advanced before, that so much *exhausted* as we are already, by the *Decay* of our Trade, our numerous and heavy *Taxes* and

and Debts, it will be *impossible* for us *long* to support a War upon the Continent, without *sinking under* the Weight of it: That, on the contrary, our Enemies having taken Advantage of the long *Peace* they enjoyed, to pay off most Part of their Debts, and give all Manner of Encouragement to Trade in all its Branches, by *easing* the Manufacturer of the most burthensome Taxes, and not only *discouraging*, but even *prohibiting* the Wear of all foreign Merchandize, (in which Piece of sound Policy and publick Spirit we have always been *too wise* to follow their Example), are *better able* now to support another *ten Years War* than they were in the Reign of Lewis XIV. even though it should prove as *unsuccessful* as *that* in the Time of their late Grand Monarque, which is *altogether unlikely*. Let us suppose then, for once, that our Armies will be blest'd with as *uninterrupted Success* as in the late Queen's Reign, though that is highly improbable; the *infallible Consequence* of that would be, that we should at last *sink under our own Efforts*, and be forced to *clap up a Peace at any rate*: For such *prodigious Sums of Money* must be sent yearly out of the Kingdom to pay our Forces, whilst the *little Trade* we have yet left would be then *entirely lost*, as it certainly must, that the *Balance* would be *greatly against* us; and we should be so far from *recruiting ourselves* thereby, that other considerable Remittances must be made abroad to pay the Overplus: so that these *two continual Drains* of our Treasure would in a few Years *exhaust us* of all our *Specie*; which rendering us *utterly unable* to carry on even a *defensive War*, must leave us an *easy Prey* to the first *Invader*. And, as we are sensible our good Neighbours, whom we have been so long *wisely contributing* to aggrandize, don't want the *Inclination*, if they had but the *Power*, we must soon become a *Province* to them. This, we say, is the *evident Consequence* of our *persisting* in the Prosecution of a *Land-war*; and should this ever be our *melancholy Case*, which Heaven forbid, we leave any one to judge, whether the *Electorate of Hanover* must not follow of course; especially, as it is no Secret, that our Enemies ascribe the *carrying the War* into the *French Dominions* to the *sole Influence and Direction* of our most gracious Sovereign.